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Abstract We outline a novel theory of natural language meaning, Rich
Situated Semantics [RSS], on which the content of sentential utterances
is semantically rich and informationally situated. In virtue of its situat-
edness, an utterance’s rich situated content varies with the informational
situation of the cognitive agent interpreting the utterance. In virtue of its
richness, this content contains information beyond the utterance’s lexi-
cally encoded information. The agent-dependence of rich situated content
solves a number of problems in semantics and the philosophy of language
(cf. [14, 20, 25]). In particular, since RSS varies the granularity of utter-
ance contents with the interpreting agent’s informational situation, it
solves the problem of finding suitably fine- or coarse-grained objects for
the content of propositional attitudes. In virtue of this variation, a lay-
man will reason with more propositions than an expert.
Keywords: Information-sensitivity · interpreter-dependence · proposi-
tional attitude contents · rich semantic content · situated semantics
1 Introduction
The same utterance of a (non-indexical) sentence has a different meaning to
different interpreting agents. This is due to the fact that different agents have
different information about the sentence’s subject matter, which is used in the
utterance’s agent-specific interpretation: Depending on the agent’s background
knowledge, the utterance of (1) in a particular context will be interpreted as an
informationally rich proposition (e.g. as a proposition which contains the infor-
mation that the inhabitant of Gobbler’s Knob is a groundhog/that Punxsutawney
Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot species) or as an informationally
poorer proposition which does not contain this additional information.
(1) Punxsutawney Phil is a groundhog.
Most formal theories of semantic natural language content (e.g. [9,27,28,32])
restrict the content of sentential utterances to the utterances’ lexical information
(for (1): to the information that the referent of the name Punxsutawney Phil is
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a groundhog), and delegate all other available information about the utterance’s
subject matter to areas like pragmatics or psychology. However, Moltmann [26]
(cf. [7]) has observed that they thus seriously underspecify the content of propo-
sitional attitudes. We observe that, as a result, these theories are unable to ex-
plain why an inference is valid for some agents, but invalid for others.
This paper solves the above problem by complementing the traditional no-
tions of utterance content with a new kind of semantic content, rich situated con-
tent. The latter includes non-lexically encoded information that is available to
the interpreter of the utterance at the time of the interpretation. Below, we first
sketch our new theory of linguistic meaning, called Rich Situated Semantics (in
Sect. 2). We then present the rigid granularity problem for the content of propo-
sitional attitudes (in Sect. 3) and show how Rich Situated Semantics solves this
problem (in Sect. 4). Section 5 answers a salient objection to our solution to the
rigid granularity problem. The paper closes by identifying other intensional phe-
nomena that lend themselves to a rich situated semantic treatment (in Sect. 6).
2 Rich Situated Semantics
Rich Situated Semantics [hereafter, RSS] (cf. [19,20]) is a new theory of natural
language meaning on which the content of (utterances1 of) declarative sentences
is semantically rich and informationally situated. In virtue of its situatedness, the
rich situated content of a sentence varies with the informational situation of the
cognitive agent interpreting the sentence. In virtue of its richness, this content
contains information beyond the sentence’s lexically encoded information. Rich
situated content is thus a special form of descriptive content.
Below, we first illustrate the richness and situatedness of sentential content
and identify a number of theories from linguistics, philosophy, cognitive and
computer science that suggest this richness and/or situatedness (in Sect. 2.1). We
then specify the RSS-interpretation of sentences (in Sect. 2.2) and identify some
notable consequences of this interpretation with respect to linguistic entailment
and equivalence (in Sect. 2.3). The section closes with a definition of truth for
Rich Situated Semantics (in Sect. 2.4).
2.1 Illustration and inspiration for RSS
To familiarize the reader with the core idea of RSS, we introduce rich linguistic
contents by means of an example: Consider the interpretation of (1) by three
agents, viz. Alf, Bea, and Chris. Assume that, re Punxsutawney Phil (hereafter,
‘Phil’), these agents have the following information:
1 We hereafter sometimes use the expression ‘content of a sentence’ (or ‘sentential
content’), instead of ‘content of an utterance of a sentence’. This is merely a termi-
nological shortcut. The reader is asked to keep in mind that sentences are uttered by
a speaker (with certain background information) in a spatiotemporal and commu-
nicative situation, and are directed at an addressee (with a certain, likely different,
background information). The relevance of the addressee’s information for the inter-
pretation of the utterance is the central topic of this paper.
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Alf: Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob.
Bea: Phil is celebrated each February 2nd.
Chris: Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob; Phil is celebrated each February 2nd.
Since rich situated content includes the interpreter’s information about the sen-
tence’s subject matter (here: Phil), (1) is interpreted by Alf as (1.i), by Bea as
(1.ii), and by Chris as (1.iii):
(1) i. Phil is a groundhog who/and lives in Gobbler’s Knob.
ii. Phil is a groundhog who is celebrated each February 2nd.
iii. Phil is a groundhog who lives in Gobbler’s Knob and is celebrated
each February 2nd.
The non-identity of the rich contents of (1) at Alf’s, Bea’s, and Chris’ infor-
mational situation witnesses the situatedness of linguistic content in RSS. The
greater informativeness of the rich content of (1) at any of the above situations
in comparison to the sentence’s traditional, possible-worlds content (which only
contains the sentence’s lexical information) witnesses the richness of linguistic
content in RSS. In particular, the rich content of (1) at Alf’s informational sit-
uation contains the information that Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob, which is not
contained in the sentence’s the lexical information.
The situatedness of linguistic content is inspired by work in situation se-
mantics (cf. [3, 15]), semantic contextualism (cf. [13, 17]), relativism (cf. [6, 22]),
and dynamic semantics (cf. [11,42]). Situation semantics assumes that sentences
are uttered in and their utterances evaluated with respect to partial possible
worlds (i.e. situations). Contextualism and relativism assume, respectively, that
the same sentence can have a different content in different contexts and that the
truth-value or the content of a sentence vary with the context of assessment.
Dynamic semantics suggests the situatedness of linguistic content by interpret-
ing sentences as state transitions, i.e. as functions from information states to the
result of updating these states with the sentence’s lexical information.
Rich linguistic content is found in Fregean theories of belief content (cf. [5,
10]), in semantic descriptivism and generalized quantifier theory (cf. [2,39]), and
in frame semantics (cf. [1, 21]). Fregean theories of belief content assume that
any adequate representation of belief contents involves the modes of presenta-
tion of the individuals and properties the beliefs are about. Descriptivism and
generalized quantifier theory assume that proper names are interpreted analo-
gously to definite NPs, i.e. as sets of properties of individuals. Frame semantics
represents utterance contents by rich recursive feature structures that account
for the content of mental concepts.
2.2 The RSS-interpretation of sentential utterances
To capture the situatedness of rich linguistic content, RSS interprets sentences as
functions from interpreters’ informational situations to the sentences’ rich con-
tents at these situations (i.e. to the sentences’ situated contents). These functions
are objects of type sα, where α is the type for situated sentential contents.
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The richness of situated sentential contents is captured via (characteristic
functions of) partial sets of situations (s.t. α := st).2 Such sets are familiar
from the representation of sentential contents in generalizations of possible world
semantics, including some versions of situation semantics (e.g. [15,28]). However,
the set of situations that serves as the content of a sentence in RSS is generally
much smaller than the set of situations that serves as the content of this sentence
in situational generalizations of possible world semantics. This is due to the fact
that – in addition to being restricted to situations in which the sentence is true –
the RSS-set is further restricted to situations which contain the interpreting
agent’s information about the sentence’s subject matter. For example, while (1)-
as-received-by-Alf is interpreted as (2) in situational possible world semantics, it
is interpreted as (3) in RSS. Below, i is a variable over situations, as reflected in
the superscript s. The formulas groundhog (phil )(i) and livesinGK(phil )(i) assert
that Phil is a groundhog in i and that Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob in i.
λis[groundhog (phil )(i)] (2)
λis[groundhog (phil )(i) ∧ livesinGK (phil )(i)] (3)
To capture the informational imperfection of cognitive agents, we identify
situations with partial (i.e. informationally incomplete) spatio-temporal parts of
worlds3 in which the parts’ individual inhabitants may fail to have some of the
properties which they have at the relevant world-part. Situations in rich situated
semantics are thus “partial specifications of some of the entities in the universe
with [their] properties” [23, p. 614]. They are obtained from worlds by reducing
the information about the world’s inhabitants to the information available to
the agent at the given point in time. As a result, situations are agent- and time-
specific: the same agent may be in different informational situations at different
points in time.
We assume that situated sentential contents are partially (or selectively) rich,
i.e. that they contain – next to the sentence’s lexical information – all and only in-
formation about the sentence’s subject matter that is available to the interpreter
of the sentence at the time of the interpretation. As a result, RSS interprets
any sentence p as a function from informational situations i to sets of situations
whose members contain the lexical information of p together with all informa-
tion from i which regards some individual about which p carries information.
For convenience, sentences that carry information about some individual a will
hereafter be called aboutness-relevant with respect to a, or a-relevant. Sentences
that carry information about the same individuals are called aboutness-identical
(w.r.t. these individuals). The RSS-interpretation of a sentence p is given in (4).
λisλjs[pst(j) ∧ ∀qst([q(i) ∧ ∃xe(abt (x)(q) ∧ abt (x)(p))] q(j))] (4)
2 One can increase the granularity of situated sentential contents by analyzing them
instead as semantically primitive (i.e. non-analyzable) propositions (cf. [8,29,32,41]).
The development of hyperfine-grained RSS is left for another occasion.
3 The inclusion of impossible worlds or situations (cf. [12,35]) captures the possibility
of agents’ misinformedness or false belief. For reasons of space, the consideration of
impossible worlds or situations is left for future research.
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In (4), x is a variable over individuals. The formula ϕt  ψt asserts that ψ con-
tains the information of ϕ (i.e. that ψ is less partial/better defined than ϕ), s.t.
ψ is true if ϕ is true and is false if ϕ is false (cf. [28, pp. 50, 47]). ϕ ψ is defined
as ((ϕ∧ψ)∨((ϕ∨ψ)∧∗)) = ϕ, where ∗ is the neither-true-nor-false formula. The
introduction of is made necessary by our association of t with the set of truth-
combinations, by the resulting existence of two different orderings on the type-t
domain (i.e. a truth- and an approximation-ordering), and by the reference of the
material conditional to the ‘wrong’ ordering for our purposes (i.e. to the truth-
ordering; on this ordering, ψ is true if ϕ is true, but ϕ is false if ψ is false).
The formula abt (xe)(qst) asserts that q carries information about the referent
of x. The behavior of abt is governed by a variant of the axioms from [30, p. 129]
(cf. [18, p. 120–121]). These axioms include the aboutness-relevance (with respect
to an individual) of atomic formulas that contain the designating constant for the
individual as a constituent, the closure of aboutness-relevant formulas under non-
contradictory conjunction,4 the closure of aboutness-relevant formulas under dis-
junction (given that both disjuncts contain information about the subject mat-
ter), and the robustness of aboutness under semantic equivalence.
To better understand the interpretation of sentences in Rich Situated Seman-
tics, consider the rich content of (1) at Alf’s current informational situation, σalf
(in (5)). We assume for simplicity that σalf only contains the information that
Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob (cf. Sect. 2.1) and that Bea has red hair. Since only
the first-mentioned informational item of σalf regards Phil, (1) will be RSS-inter-
preted at σalf as (3).
λi [groundhog(phil )(i)∧∀q([q(σalf) ∧ ∃xe(abt (x)(q)∧abt (x)(p))] q(i))] (5)
≡ λi [groundhog(phil )(i) ∧ ∀q([q(σalf) ∧ abt (phil)(q)] q(i))]
We next identify a concrete candidate for the set of situations described by
(5): Assume a universe consisting of four situations, σalf, σ1, σ2, and σ3 and two
individuals: Phil (abbreviated p) and Bea (abbreviated b). We assume that Phil
lives in Gobbler’s Knob (Kp) in σalf, σ1, and σ2, that Bea has red hair (Rb) in
σalf and σ2, and that Phil is a groundhog (Gp) in σ1, σ2, and σ3 (cf. Fig. 1).
Then, since the lexical information of (1) (i.e. Phil is a groundhog) and the
Phil-relevant information from σalf (i.e. Phil lives is Gobbler’s Knob) are included
only in σ1 and σ2 (and in none of the other situations), the rich situated content
of (1) at σalf is represented by the set {σ1, σ2} (underbraced in Fig. 1).
2.3 Consequences of RSS
The RSS-interpretation of sentential utterances has a number of important con-
sequences for the individuation of situated sentential contents. In particular,
since RSS updates the available information about a sentence’s subject matter
4 To avoid the inclusion of information that does not regard the subject matter, we de-
mand (contra Perry) that both conjuncts be aboutness-relevant. This also avoids the
problem of obtaining aboutness-‘relevant’ conjunctions by combining an aboutness-
irrelevant sentence with a trivially aboutness-relevant verum, or with falsum.
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Figure 1. The meaning-at- alf of (1).
Then, since the lexical information of (1) (i.e. Phil is a groundhog) and the Phil-
relevant information from  alf (i.e. Phil lives is Gobbler’s Knob) are included only
in  1 and  2 (and in none of the other situations), the meaning of (1) at Alf’s in-
formational situation is represented by the set { 1, 2} (underbraced in Fig. 1).
2.3 Consequences of RSS
The RSS-interpretation of sentential utterances has a number of important con-
sequences for the individuation of situated sentential contents. In particular,
since RSS updates the available information about a sentence’s subject matter
with the sentence’s lexical information, it identifies the contents of sentences at
situations that di↵er only with respect to the inclusion of the sentence’s lexical
information. Consider the interpretation of (1) at Len’s informational situation
in which Phil is a groundhog and lives in Gobbler’s Knob. (We assume that this
situation does not contain any other information about Phil, s.t., as regards Phil,
it is identical with  1): At this situation, (1) has the same meaning (i.e. { 1, 2})
as at  alf.
Note that, although (1) has the same rich content at Alf’s and at Len’s infor-
mational situation, its utterance has a di↵erent e↵ect on Alf’s than on Len’s sit-
uation: While (1)-as-received-by-Alf updates Alf’s information about Phil with
the information that Phil is a groundhog (s.t. Alf’s information is extended to
the information from  2), it leaves Len’s informational situation unchanged. The
updating e↵ect of (1) on Alf’s Phil-specific information is witnessed by the fact
that (the information associated with) the content of (1) at Alf’s informational
situation (i.e. { 1, 2}) is properly contained in (the information associated with)
the content of (6) at Alf’s situation (i.e. { alf, 1, 2}).
(6) Punxsutawney Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob.
As a result of its interpretations’ informational richness, RSS further identifies
the contents of di↵erent aboutness-identical sentences at situations which contain
the sentences’ lexical information. Consider the interpretation of (1) and (6)
at  1: Since this situation already contains the lexical information of (1) and
(6), these sentences have the same content (i.e. { 1, 2}) at this situation.
We will see in Section 4 that the identification-at-a-situation of the contents
of di↵erent aboutness-identical sentences solves the problem of finding suitably
Figure 1. The rich content-at-σ lf f (1).
with the sentence’s lexical information, it identifies the rich contents of sentences
at situations whose information about the sentence’s subject matter differs only
with respect to the inclusion of the sentence’s lexical information. Consider the
interpretation of (1) at Len’s informational situation in which Phil is a ground-
hog and lives in Gobbler’s Knob. (We assume that this situation does not contain
any other information about Phil, s.t., as regards Phil, it is identical to σ1): at
this situation, (1) has the same rich content (i.e. {σ1, σ2}) as at σalf.
Note that, although (1) has the same rich content at Alf’s and at Len’s in-
formational situation, its utterance has a different effect on Alf’s than on Len’s
situation: while (1)-as-received-by-Alf updates Alf’s information about Phil with
the information that Phil is a groundhog (s.t. Alf’s information is extended to the
information from σ2), it leaves Len’s informational situatio unchanged. The up-
dating effect of (1) on Alf’s P il-specific information is witnessed by th fac at
(the information ass ciated with) rich conte t of (1) at Alf’s informational
situation (i.e. {σ1, σ2}) is properly contained in (the information associated with)
the rich content of (6) at Alf’s situation (i.e. {σalf, σ1, σ2}).
(6) Punxsutawney Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob.
As a result of the richness of situated contents, RSS further identifies the
contents of different aboutness-identical sentences at situations which contain the
sentences’ lexical information. Consider the interpretation of (1) and (6) at σ1:
since this situation already cont ins the lexical information of (1) a d (6), these
sentences have the same rich content (i.e. {σ1, σ2}) at this situation.
We will s e in Section 4 that the dentification-at-a-situation of the rich
contents of different aboutness-identical sentences solves the problem of finding
suitably fine- or coarse-grained objects for the content of propositional attitudes.
This problem is described in Section 3.
2.4 Truth-evaluation in RSS
We have described situated sentential contents as the results of updating the
available information about the sentence’s subject matter with the sentence’s
lexical information. As a result of this description, situated sentential contents
in RSS contain much more information than sentential contents in situational
generalizations of possible world semantics. However, much of this information is
irrelevant for the sentences’ evaluation. For example, it does not (or should not)
matter for the truth of (1) whether Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob. Since non-
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situated sentential contents (type s(st)) do not have the ‘right’ type for truth-
evaluable objects (i.e. they do not yield a truth-value when applied to a world),
we need to provide a custom truth-evaluation procedure for sentences in RSS.
To evaluate the truth of a sentence in Rich Situated Semantics, we check
whether the world of evaluation w is a member of the union of the sentence’s rich
contents at all informational situations. The resulting truth-definition is given
below. In this definition, we use denotation brackets, J · K, as a notational device
for rich non-situated sentential contents (i.e. type-s(st)):
Definition 1 (Truth at a world). In Rich Situated Semantics, a sentence p
is true at a world w iff w ∈ ⋃σsJpK(σ), where JpK(σ) is the rich interpretation
of p at the situation σ.
By taking the union of the rich contents, JpK(σ), of p for each situation σ, we ob-
tain the set of situations in which p is true. This set is a situational generalization
of the classical Lewisian proposition denoted by p.
The rationale behind the above strategy is as follows: since we assume the
existence of a situation for every consistent combination of information (includ-
ing the ‘empty’ combination; cf. [31, 32]), the members of the above union will
never share more than the lexical information of p (plus p’s presuppositions).
Since we identify the result of updating a situation’s information via incompat-
ible information with the empty set of situations5, the members of this union
will never share less than the lexical information of p. In particular, situations
which contain the information that not-p will not contribute their information
to the above union.
Notably, unions of rich situated contents provide an easy way of retrieving
the traditional notion of (lexical, ‘poor’) content. This notion is required for the
explanation of a number of phenomena, including the use of sentences to state
facts (cf. (7)), to give reasons (cf. (8)), and to express shared belief (cf. (9)). For
example, Eve may utter (1) to communicate the fact that Phil is a groundhog
(rather than some other fact she knows about Phil) (cf. (7)) or to give a reason
for Phil’s long teeth (cf. (8)). Many other sentences which receive an identical
interpretation at Eve’s informational situation would not serve this purpose.
(7) Eve asserted that Phil was a groundhog.
(8) Since Phil is a groundhog, his teeth never stop growing.
(9) Len and Eve believe that Phil is a groundhog.
We next turn to the rigid granularity problem for the content of propositional
attitudes. This problem lies in the fact that most theories of linguistic content
assume a single, uniform level of granularity for belief contents. As a result of
this assumption, these theories cannot explain why an inference is valid for some
epistemic agents (given their background knowledge), but invalid for others.
5 This is due to the fact that the available information about the sentence’s subject
matter at these situations will include the sentence’s lexical information. Since we
have excluded impossible situations from our considerations (cf. fn. 3), no situation
contains both an item of information and its complement.
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3 The Rigid Granularity Problem
To avoid predicting agents’ logical omniscience, many theories of formal seman-
tics (e.g. [9, 28, 32, 41]) assume hyperfine-grained sentential contents that have
stricter identity-conditions than sets of possible worlds. The level of granularity
of these contents is chosen in accordance with speakers’ intuitions about syn-
onymy (cf. [32, p. 553]). Since most speakers judge the contents of many inten-
sionally equivalent sentences (e.g. of (1) and (10)) to be non-identical, hyperfine-
grained semantics distinguish the contents of these sentences.6
(10) Punxsutawney Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot species.
The success of these semantics is hampered by the fact that the above iden-
tity- (or non-identity-)judgements are not shared by all speakers for all sentence-
pairs. This is due to the fact that speakers’ judgements about sentential synony-
my are influenced by their background information about the sentences’ subject
matter. Depending on their informational situation, speakers will thus identify or
distinguish the contents of the same sentences. Consider the case of (1) and (10):
since she is familiar with the different properties of groundhogs, a groundhog ex-
pert (e.g. Eve in (11)) will identify the contents of (1) and (10). Since he is un-
aware of this fact, a groundhog layman (e.g. Len in (12)) will treat the contents of
(1) and (10) as distinct. Any reasoner who is familiar with Eve and Len’s level of
groundhog expertise (s.t. (s)he knows that (1) and (10) have the same rich con-
tent at Eve’s, but different rich contents at Len’s informational situation), will
conclude (11b) from (11a), but not (12b) from (12a). Since hyperfine-grained se-
mantics assume the same level of granularity of content for all agents interpreting
a sentence, they cannot distinguish between the validity of these inferences.
(11) a. Eve knows that Phil is a groundhog. T
b. Eve knows that Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot
species. T
(12) a. Len knows that Phil is a groundhog. T
b. Len knows that Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot
species. F
In particular, since hyperfine-grained semantics distinguish the contents of (1)
and (10), they will counterintuitively predict the invalidity of (11). Since tradi-
tional (coarse-grained) possible world semantics identifies the content of (1) and
(10), it will counterintuitively predict the validity of (12).
4 Rich Situated Attitudes
Rich Situated Semantics solves the above problem by varying the granularity of
sentential contents with the informational situation of the sentence’s interpreter.
6 The identification of these sentences’ traditional contents in possible world semantics
is due to the fact that, in the actual world at the current time (cf. the adjective exist-
ing in (10)), groundhogs are the largest marmot species.
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This is possible since RSS identifies the contents of different aboutness-identical
sentences at situations which contain the sentences’ lexical information.
4.1 Solving the rigid granularity problem
Since, as we will hereafter assume, Eve’s informational situation, σeve, contains
the lexical information of (1), (6), and (10), RSS identifies the contents of (1)
and (10) at this situation (i.e. (14)). Since Len’s situation does not contain the
lexical information of (10) (s.t. (10) is interpreted as an update on Len’s informa-
tion about Phil), RSS distinguishes the contents of (1) (i.e. (3)) and (10) (i.e.
(14)) at Len’s informational situation. With respect to the relevant subject do-
main, a layman will thus reason with more sentential contents than an expert.
λis[groundhog (phil )(i) ∧ largestmarmot (phil )(i)] (13)
λis([groundhog (phil )(i) ∧ largestmarmot (phil )(i)] ∧ livesinGK (phil )(i)) (14)
The variation of sentences’ semantic granularity with the epistemic agent’s
informational situation explains the intuitive validity of the inference from (11)
and the intuitive invalidity of the inference from (12). However, this explanation
presupposes the reasoner’s familiarity with Eve and Len’s level of expertise about
Phil (cf. Sect. 3). Reasoners who are not familiar with the two agents’ levels of
subject expertise (s.t. they are, in particular, unaware of Eve’s identical interpre-
tation of (1) and (10)) will not be able to make the inference from (11).7
To capture the dependence of (11) on the reasoner’s awareness of the agent’s
subject expertise, we stipulate the following: when they occur in the complement
of epistemic verbs like know, sentences are interpreted as sets of situations whose
members only encode the agent’s information about the sentence’s subject mat-
ter of whose availability to the agent the reasoner is aware.8 For the occurrence
of (1) from (11a), this set is specified in (15). There, r is a variable for the rea-
soner. The formula aware (r)(q)(σ) asserts the reasoner’s awareness that σ in-
cludes the information of q.
λi [groundhog (phil )(i) ∧ ∀q([aware (r)(q)(σeve) ∧ abt (phil)(q)] q(i))] (15)
We illustrate the reasoner-dependence of epistemic inferences by means of an ex-
ample: Compare the interpretation of (11a) and (11b) by two reasoners, Dan and
Fred, who have different degrees of familiarity with Eve’s information about Phil.
In particular, Dan knows that, in σeve Phil is a groundhog, belongs to the largest
existing marmot species, and lives in Gobbler’s Knob. Fred only knows that Phil
is a groundhog in this situation. The complements of the occurrences of know
from (11a) and (11b) are then interpreted as (14) by Dan and as (2) (cf. (11a))
and (13) (cf. (11b)) by Fred. Since only Dan is, thus, aware of Eve’s identification
7 The ability of (11b) to extend the reasoner’s knowledge depends on this unfamiliarity.
8 Admittedly, the reasoner may wrongly assume that Len also knows (10). This as-
sumption explains why the reasoner may still make the inference from (12). It can
be captured by replacing the reasoner’s required awareness of the inclusion of a par-
ticular item of information in the agent’s information state by the reasoner’s belief
about this inclusion (which does not entail the factivity of this inclusion).
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of the rich contents of (1) and (10), only he can make the inference from (11).
Notably, the inference from (11) can also be made solely on the basis of Dan’s
awareness of Eve’s general expertise about Phil, which does not require Dan’s
familiarity with the particular content of Eve’s information state. This expertise
entails the inclusion-in-σeve of all Phil-relevant information that is true at the
actual world, @. The resulting interpretation of (1) from (11a) is given in (16).
λi [groundhog (phil )(i) ∧ ∀q ([aware (r)(q)(@) ∧ abt (phil )(q)] q(i))] (16)
Our previous considerations suggest the distinction between two types of va-
lidity, relative to an agent’s informational situation. The types are defined below:
Definition 2 (Situational validity). An inference is valid relative to the in-
formational situation σ of some specific reasoner (or is valid-at-σ) iff the rich
content at σ of the inference’s premise(s) is a subset of the rich content at σ of
the inference’s conclusion.
Definition 3 (Validity simpliciter). An inference is valid simpliciter iff, at
all informational situations σ, the rich content at σ of the inference’s premise(s)
is a subset of the rich content at σ of the inference’s conclusion.
The condition from Definition 3 corresponds to requiring the entailment of the
traditional, possible worlds-interpretation of the conclusion by the traditional,
possible worlds-interpretation of the premise(s). The different types of validity
are illustrated respectively by (11) and (17):
(17) a. Eve knows that Phil is a groundhog and lives in Gobbler’s Knob. T
b. Eve knows that Phil is a groundhog. T
Since the situated interpretation of (11a) does not entail the situated interpre-
tation of (11b) at some situations (e.g. at σ1), (11) is not valid simpliciter.
4.2 Consequences of situating attitudes
As a result of its rich situated interpretation of epistemic complements, RSS also
predicts the validity of inferences between epistemic reports like (18), whose com-
plements are not intensionally equivalent.
(18) a. Eve knows that Phil is a groundhog. T
b. Eve knows that Phil lives in Gobbler’s Knob. T
The validity of these inferences may be justified by the reasoner’s familiarity with
the epistemic agent’s level of subject expertise: a reasoner (e.g. Dan) who is aware
of the agent’s degree of informedness about the interpreted sentence’s subject
matter will follow the agent in identifying his/her situated interpretation of the
complements of know from (18a) and (18b). However, intuitively, inferences like
(18) have a different kind of validity from inferences like (11).
To block inferences of the form of (18), we modify the content of the epistem-
ically embedded occurrence of (1) from (15) to the set of situations whose mem-
bers only encode the information contained in the complement’s lexical informa-
tion of whose availability to Eve the reasoner is aware. This modification restricts
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the set of validly substitutable complements of epistemic verbs like know to CPs
that are classically entailed9 by the CP. For the complement of know from (11a),
this is achieved by (19). There, the variable w ranges over possible worlds.
λi∀q ([(∀w [groundhog (phil)(w)→ q(w)]∧ aware (r)(q)(σeve))∧ (19)
abt (phil )(q)] q(i))
Consider Dan’s interpretation of the complements from (18a) and (18b). Follow-
ing (19), these complements are interpreted as (13) (cf. (18a)) and (20) (cf. (18b)).
Since the set of situations denoted by (13) is not contained in the set of situations
denoted by (20), the inference from (18) is no longer valid on this interpretation.
λis[livesinGK (phil )(i)] (20)
The interpretation from (19) is in line with the understanding of proposi-
tional knowledge as focusing on a particular item of the agent’s subject-relevant
information (at a given time), rather than as surveying all of his or her informa-
tion (at this time). It differs from most attitude treatments by extending propo-
sitional knowledge to the union of the sentence’s lexical information and the
available aboutness-relevant information of its traditional entailments.
Our previous considerations may have made it seem as if our interpretation
of epistemic complements was only an ad hoc move to prevent counterintuitive
inferences of the form of (18). This is not the case: Since different verbs have
differently strict requirements on the substitution of their complements (with
verbs like remember even allowing the replacement by other than the classically
entailed complements), the same sentence requires a differently fine-grained in-
terpretation in different contexts. This observation calls for a ‘modular’ approach
to granularity, which varies the granularity of sentential interpretations with the
sentence’s embedding context. By assuming interpretations with the granularity
of (5) as the default case, and allowing different verbs to reduce (cf. (15)) or rel-
atively increase the level of granularity (cf. (19)), RSS provides such modularity.
Consider the substitution properties of the complements of the verbs say ver-
batim, know, and remember : while know allows the substitution of its comple-
ment by sentences with the same subject matter to which the complement is tra-
ditionally equivalent (cf. the intuitive support for (11)), say verbatim does not al-
low such a substitution (cf. the intuitive support against (21), below). In contrast
to the class of ‘substitutable’ complements of the verb know, the class of sub-
stitutable complements of the verb remember extends beyond the complement’s
traditional equivalents. The substitution-generality of the complement of remem-
ber is witnessed by the intuitive support for the inference from (22).10
(21) a. Eve said verbatim that Phil was a groundhog. T
b. Eve said verbatim that Phil was a woodchuck. F
9 Entailment is here defined in terms of (subset) inclusion of sets of possible worlds.
10 This inference assumes that the complements of the two occurrences of remember
from (22) describe the same remembered situation. The intuitive validity of this type
of inference is discussed in detail in [20, Sect. 4, 5].
12 Kristina Liefke and Mark Bowker
(22) a. Dan remembered that Phil was nibbling at a dandelion. T
b. Dan remembered that Phil was endearing. T
In addition to a modular account of complement restriction (above), RSS also
enables a modular account of a granularity that is determined by non-linguistic
context. This account explains the observation that the same sentence requires
a differently fine- (or coarse-)grained interpretation in different communicative
contexts. Consider the complement of the verb say verbatim from (21a): This
verb typically does not allow the substitution of its complement by any other
sentence. The described ban on substitution even extends to pairs of classically
equivalent sentences which receive an identical RSS-interpretation at the epis-
temic agent’s current information state: in court, a witness’ utterance of (21b) –
instead of the original (21a) – will be counted against her and may even be pun-
ishable. However, these and other substitutions seem admissible in cases in which
less is at stake. These include less formal social contexts, like friends gossipping
about Eve.
The interpretation of the complements of epistemic verbs from (15) and (19)
suggests the possibility of providing a modular account of contextually deter-
mined granularity. Because of the semantic effect of pragmatic factors (here:
the respective social context and its associated level of formality), this account
would involve reference to some version of pragmatic enrichment (cf. [4,34]). We
leave the detailed development of this account for another occasion.
5 Objections and Answers
We have shown in the preceding section that RSS solves the rigid granular-
ity problem for the content of propositional attitudes. However, there exists a
widely-used – arguably simpler and more salient – alternative solution. This solu-
tion lies in the assumption of a hyperfine-grained semantics that distinguishes the
contents of intensionally equivalent sentences and in the introduction of an ad-
ditional premise stating the epistemic agent’s awareness of the co-intensionality
(equivalence) of the two complements. For (11), such a premise is given in (11b)′.
(11)′ a. Eve knows that Phil is a groundhog. T
b. Eve knows that Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot
species iff he is a groundhog. T
c. Eve knows that Phil is a member of the largest existing marmot
species. T
Premise (11)′ can even be replaced by the more general premise (11)′′:
(11)′′ b. Eve knows that groundhogs are the largest existing marmot species,
and vice versa.
The introduction of either of the above premises serves the same role as
the rich interpretation of the two complements in RSS: it connects the premise
(i.e. (11a)) with the conclusion by asserting the obtaining of an equivalence re-
lation between the complements of the two occurrences of the verb know. Since
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RSS identifies the rich contents of the two complements at Eve’s informational
situation (s.t. the complements are also equivalent in RSS), it does not require
the introduction of an additional premise establishing this equivalence.
Its initial appeal notwithstanding, the above strategy lacks three desirable
features of our RSS-account of the rigid granularity problem. These include the
possibility of enabling inferences of the form of (11) without reference to a specific
item of the agent’s knowledge (i), the easy generalizability to granularity prob-
lems involving verbs from other verb classes (ii), and the provision of a modular
account of (linguistic or non-linguistic) contextually determined granularity (iii).
Feature (iii) has been discussed in some detail at the end of Section 4.2. Features
(i) and (ii) are discussed below:
Ad (i): Premises (11b)′ and (11b)′′ specify the particular item of the agent’s
knowledge that enables the inference from (11a) to (11b). However, reasoning
often proceeds more holistically through association (cf. [40]). In particular, to
make the inference from (11), the reasoner does not need to identify a specific
inference pattern that ensures formal validity. Instead, it suffices for him to know
that, at σeve, the complements from (11a) and (11b) have the same rich content,
such that they allow mutual substitution. This is achieved via the reasoner’s
awareness that σeve includes both the lexical information of (1) and (10) (cf. (15))
or through his awareness of Eve’s general expertise about Phil (cf. (16)).
Ad (ii): Our previous considerations have focused on the complements of
epistemic verbs like know. However, variants of the rigid granularity problem also
arise for the contents of other attitudes, including perceptual attitudes (e.g. see),
emotional attitudes (e.g. fear), and evaluative attitudes (e.g. admire). In contrast
to premises like (11b)′ that specify epistemic attitudes, premises that specify per-
ceptual, emotional, or evaluative attitudes are semantically deviant (cf. (23b))
(23) a. Eve saw/feared/admired that Len (would) pet Phil. T
b. #Eve saw/feared/admired that Len (would) pet the best-
x known member of the largest existing marmot species
x iff he (would) pet Phil. ?
c. Eve saw/feared/admired that Len (would) pet the best-
known member of the largest existing marmot species T
The deviance of (23b) can be removed by replacing the occurrence of saw (or
of feared or admired) by the verb know (in (23b)′).
(23)′ b. Eve knew that Len (would) pet the best-known member of the lar-
gest existing marmot species iff he (would) pet Phil.
However, the resulting premise presupposes a connection between knowledge and
perception (or between knowledge and evaluations or the emotions) that is not
made explicit in everyday reasoning or in RSS.
The above is not to question the validity of the inference from (23a) and
(23b)′ to (23c). Rather, it observes the difficulty of explaining this validity in
semantic theories which exclude the agent’s non-lexical information from the
relevant notion of linguistic content. This difficulty originates in a lack of corre-
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spondence between the contents of perception (or of emotion or evaluation) and
of knowledge in these theories. In particular, in these theories, the occurrences
of the sentence Len pets Phil from (23a) and (23b)′ are interpreted, respectively,
as subsets of the set of Len-petting-Phil situations that are consistent with Eve’s
current perceptual (or emotional, or evaluative) situation (cf. (23a)) and as the
set of Len-petting-Phil situations that are consistent with Eve’s current epis-
temic, informational situation (cf. (23b)′). The absence of an explicit relation
between these two sets impedes the inference from (23a) and (23b)′ to (23c).
One could try to avoid the above problem by replacing (23b)′ instead by the
premise (23b)′′.
(23)′′ b. Eve saw/feared/admired that Len (would) pet the best-known mem-
ber of the largest existing marmot species iff she saw/feared/ad-
mired that Len (would) pet Phil.
This replacement yields a non-deviant sentence that ensures the validity of the
inference. However, since any justification of (23b)′′ will, again, need to establish
a connection between knowledge and perception (or evaluation, or the emotions),
it suffers from the same problem as the replacement of (23b) by (23b)′.
Rich Situated Semantics allows the inference from (23) by identifying the rich
contents of the complements of saw from (23a) and (23c) at Eve’s informational
situation (cf. (5), (15)). Since this identification establishes a strong semantic con-
nection between the two sentences, it does not require the introduction of an ad-
ditional premise making this connection, or a specification of the relation between
perception and knowledge.
6 Other Applications of RSS
We have shown above that Rich Situated Semantics solves the rigid granularity
problem for the content of propositional attitudes. Our presentation of RSS sug-
gests that this semantics can also be used to explain several other intensional
phenomena. In particular, RSS helps solve some familiar problems of intension-
ality that have recently resurfaced in the philosophy of language. These include
the cognitive accessibility problem for propositions (cf. [14, 25]), the problem of
rational illogical belief (cf. [36,38]), and the substitution problem for the objects
and contents of propositional attitudes (cf. [24,33]). Respectively, these problems
regard the difficulty of most mainstream theories of linguistic content to explain
how communicative agents can grasp abstract propositions, how rational agents
can jointly believe superficially contradictory propositions,11 and how the con-
tents of propositional attitudes (as denoted by the CP complements of epistemic
verbs) differ from the objects of these attitudes (as denoted by the complements’
nominalizations of the form the proposition that ).
RSS solves these problems by incorporating the interpreting agents’ informa-
tion about the sentences’ subject matter into the content of these sentences. This
11 These include Pierre’s simultaneous belief that London is pretty and that London is
not pretty (cf. [16])
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information corresponds to the agents’ mode of presentation of the subject mat-
ter (cf. [5,10,37]). In RSS, an object’s mode of presentation is represented by the
set of situations (type st) in which the object has the properties that the agent
associates with it.12 Since rich situated sentential contents depend on the infor-
mation of the sentence’s interpreting agent, they are cognitively accessible. The
ability of agents to interpret different occurrences of the same NP w.r.t. their in-
formational situations at different times further explains the possibility of ratio-
nal illogical belief. The non-substitutability of CPs by their NP nominalizations
in many contexts is explained by the situated (rich) interpretation of embedded
CPs and the non-situated (poor) interpretation of their nominalizations.
The RSS-solution to the substitution problem is presented in [20, Sect. 5.3].
The detailed description of a rich situated solution to the remaining problems is
left as a project for future work.
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